The scholar of philanthropy and nonprofit groups talks to Michael E. Hartmann about his article “The Constructed Past of Philanthropic Foundations: A Conceptual Framework.”
Peter C. Weber is an associate professor and program coordinator of the Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies Program at Auburn University. He also currently serves as president of the Nonprofit Academic Centers Council.
Among other things, Weber researches nonprofits’ organizational capacity and history. His “The Constructed Past of Philanthropic Foundations: A Conceptual Framework,” in the most-recent Philanthropia journal, examines the creation and use of “narratives of the past to support and justify their organizational strategies,” as he describes it.
“Existing nonprofit scholarship treats history as background context or as a source of empirical evidence, rather than as an object of strategic use,” Weber writes in the article.
This limits our ability to explain how organizations actively mobilize the past to justify decisions, construct identity, and influence broader institutional environments. This article addresses this gap by conceptualizing the strategic use of history through two distinctions – between history-as-precedent and history-as-narrative, and across levels of analysis (individual, organizational, and field) – and by illustrating how these uses shape organizational outcomes.
He was nice enough to join me for a recorded conversation last month. The just more than 20-minute video below is the first part of our discussion; the second is here. During the first part, he talks about Auburn’s distinctive approach to teaching philanthropy and his new article—as well as, in particular, the difference between a constructed narrative and a false or non-objective one, foundation history as something like a pendulum of interpretation, and who actually constructs foundation histories. He also offers an example of history being used to improve grantmaking, rather than merely help rationalize it.
“Organizations—whether they’re foundations, nonprofits, or businesses—make a process of selection and interpretation of past events,” Weber tells me. “It can be a program officer that develops a narrative of past actions of the organization to justify why a new program needs to be launched, or when a program needs to be cut,” he continues. “But conversely, it can also be the foundation leader or the board who construct a narrative of the past of the organization … that aims to portray” it favorably.
“My goal was to highlight the individual human element within foundations in decision-making processes,” he says. He asked himself, what role does the program officer play? “That’s how my interest started. But you can say the same thing for a strong foundation leader building a narrative of foundation identity or how he wants that foundation to be perceived, internally and externally.”
I ask Weber whether “construction” can become distortion or manipulation, particularly at large foundations with broadly formulated purposes delegated to them by now-dead donors. He agrees that can happen, especially at general-purpose foundations such as Ford and Carnegie, whose missions leave later leaders and staffs plenty of room to interpret them. But he resists equating a constructed narrative with a false or non-objective one.
“I’m not sure if I would embrace that contrast you made between ‘constructed’ and lack of objectivity,” Weber says. “For a historian, we always build a narrative. That objectively needs to be based on evidence. … The most-plausible narrative is connecting the different pieces of evidence we have—and the voice of the person who is building that narrative, the historian, is always there. I think the objective piece is trying to build a narrative based on evidence as far as possible.”
He describes foundation history as something of a pendulum of interpretation. Sometimes, foundations interpret their missions narrowly and remain relatively close to the donor’s original intent. At other times, they interpret those missions much more expansively. The toggling between narrow and broad interpretations isn’t necessarily in bad faith, he cautions, though he acknowledges that different motives and purposes can affect which interpretation prevails at any particular time.
In addition to foundation program-staff and board members, outside consultants, scholars, and commentators have a role in the construction of foundations’ historical narratives, too, Weber recognizes.
In both his article and our conversation, he points to internal foundation debates leading up to program-related investments (PRIs) as an example of history being used to improve grantmaking, rather than merely help rationalize it. Without endorsing PRIs, he cites considerations of them at major foundations, including the Ford Foundation, that were much better informed because of their reliance on history.
More broadly, Weber regards the best use of institutional history as educating about precedents and showing how earlier decisions were made. As such, of course, it can show that a proposed course of action does not “fit” the organization.
In the conversation’s second part, he discusses some risks in foundations’ uses of history, including potentially to constrain current choices; philanthropy’s need to justify itself to the public and policymakers and the role of historical narratives in providing legitimacy; ways in which foundations can better preserve and use their institutional memories, and philanthropy’s tendency to present old ideas as innovations; and the recurring tensions between presentism, long-term thinking about the future, and the “dead hand” of the past.
